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1 Selling the peace?
Corruption and post- conflict 
peacebuilding
Christine Cheng and Dominik Zaum1
Corruption has become an increasingly salient issue in war to peace trans-
itions, both for the populations of war- torn countries and for the donor 
governments, NGOs, and international and regional organisations 
involved in peacebuilding efforts. Conflict- affected countries feature 
prominently in corruption surveys as having the most serious corruption 
problems (Transparency International 2010; World Bank 2010). They 
offer an ideal environment for pervasive corruption: with their weak 
administrative institutions and often broken legal and judicial systems, 
they lack the capacity to effectively investigate and enforce prohibitions of 
corrupt behaviour. Moreover, the social norms that are expected to 
contain corruption tend to be weak or non- existent; and divisions within 
societies affected by conflict weaken shared conceptions of the public 
good (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000: 36; Philp in this volume). Further, the 
sudden inflow of donor aid and the desire of external actors to disburse it 
quickly create ample incentives and opportunities for corruption (Wilder 
and Gordon 2009).
 That countries with weak institutions and weak shared conceptions of 
the public good are more prone to corruption is not a new insight (see for 
example Nye 1967: 418). The fact that it has become a major preoccupa-
tion for peacebuilding actors and analysts in recent years is a consequence 
of the broad scope of peacebuilding (Barnett et al. 2007), defined in 
Boutros Boutros- Ghali’s Agenda for Peace as ‘actions to identify and support 
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to 
avoid a relapse into conflict’ (UN 1992). In particular, peacebuilding’s 
focus on socio- economic development and the reform and strengthening 
of political and administrative structures are strongly affected by corrup-
tion. This focus reflects two intellectual developments in particular. The 
first is the recognition of the importance of war economies in perpetuat-
ing conflict, and of the persistence of power structures rooted in war econ-
omies well into peacetime, where they become entrenched and 
consolidated through corruption (Berdal and Malone 2000; Berdal and 
Zaum 2011; Cheng 2011; Cramer 2006; Pugh et al. 2004). In addition to 
contributing to the outbreak of war and sustaining it, the political 
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economy of conflict also shapes the possibilities and the character of the 
peace that follows, as well as the efforts of local and external actors to 
shape that peace.
 The second is the increased focus by many donor governments and 
international organisations on statebuilding as an essential part of peace-
building, even though the latter encompasses a wide range of practices. 
As the weakness or even collapse of state institutions came to be seen as 
sources of conflict, peacebuilding and statebuilding have also been used 
interchangeably at times. Functioning institutions that can help to 
manage conflicts over power, resources and identity in divided societies, 
and that can effectively deliver key public goods such as security and 
justice are undoubtedly central to post- conflict stability (Call and Wyeth 
2008; Paris 2004; Zaum 2007).This emphasis on the role of political insti-
tutions and political economy in post- conflict peacebuilding has increas-
ingly shifted the attention of peacebuilders towards the issue of 
corruption.
 Closely associated with market distortion and the malfunction of polit-
ical institutions, corruption is considered a key challenge to consolidating 
peace, hindering economic development, perpetuating the unjust distri-
bution of public resources and undermining the legitimacy and effective-
ness of government (Mauro 1997b; Rose- Ackerman 1999; Seligson 2002; 
Senior 2006). In recent years, there has been a growing literature on the 
impact of corruption after conflict (Boucher et al. 2007; Large 2005; Le 
Billon 2003, 2005; O’Donnell 2008). This book aims to contribute to this 
debate by examining the specific conceptual and political challenges that 
corruption poses to post- conflict peacebuilding.
 In referring to ‘post- conflict’ countries, it is important to clarify that we 
are referring to states that have reached a formal peace agreement, even 
though violence, including armed conflict might still be pervasive. While 
peace agreements do not necessarily end violence, and the distinction 
between conflict and post- conflict might not be as meaningful to indi-
viduals on the ground who continue to experience violence in the ‘post- 
conflict’ period, peace agreements set a framework under which peace 
can take hold (Höglund 2008). Thus, despite the obvious shortcomings of 
the term, post- conflict remains a useful descriptor for our purposes.
 Across the different chapters in this volume, a complex set of issues 
emerges to shape our understanding of post- conflict corruption, its impact 
on stability and development, and the consequences of anti- corruption 
initiatives in the context of peacebuilding efforts. The chapters explore 
several questions:
•	 What	specific	forms	does	corruption	take	in	conflict	and	post-	conflict	
environments?
•	 How	do	different	 forms	of	 corruption	affect	 the	outcomes	of	peace-
building efforts?
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Selling the peace?  3
•	 How,	 and	 to	what	 extent,	 do	particular	 peacebuilding	practices	 fuel	
corruption?
•	 What	have	been	the	main	efforts	to	address	the	challenge	of	corrup-
tion in peacebuilding contexts, and how effective have these efforts 
been?
While the focus of this book is predominantly on political corruption, 
engaged in by persons exercising some form of public authority, we do 
not want to suggest that corruption in the private sector or amongst inter-
national actors does not exist, or that it is mostly benign and of little con-
sequence. As reports into corruption amongst contractors and 
international military personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq have suggested, 
these forms of corruption have serious implications for international 
peacebuilding and stabilisation efforts (Madhani 2010; Bowen 2009). 
However, given that successful and sustainable peacebuilding undoubtedly 
requires trusted local institutions – be they formal or informal – corrup-
tion within this context seems an appropriate focus for this inquiry.
 To frame the contributions to this volume, and to identify some of the 
core themes that feature across the chapters, the remainder of this intro-
duction examines four issues. First, it will briefly explore some of the prob-
lems arising from efforts to define corruption and the implications for our 
analysis. The second section discusses the impact of corruption on peace-
building outcomes, while the third highlights the impact of peacebuilding 
practices on corruption. The fourth section discusses why anti- corruption 
measures taken during post- conflict transitions have often not achieved 
their objectives. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of the book.
 Corruption is a complex and contested issue. The different definitions 
of corruption employed by the contributors to this book and their differ-
ing assessment of the consequences of corruption for peacebuilding testify 
to this. These differences reflect diverging views on the role of governance 
and institutions, different conceptions of peace, and in the case studies, 
the particular social and political structures of the countries under study. 
Moreover, these differences merely underline that both context and per-
spective matter when examining complex social phenomena like corrup-
tion, and that care needs to be taken in any effort to apply insights from 
one case to another.
Conceptualising corruption
Corruption has become a key lens through which peacebuilders observe 
the political, institutional and social dynamics in post- conflict societies. Yet 
growing awareness of corruption as a problem in post- conflict peacebuild-
ing has also resulted in the concept becoming a catch- all term. Invocations 
of corruption have encompassed very distinct social problems including 
the mismanagement of public assets, weak and dysfunctional government 
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institutions, complex relationships between political actors and public eco-
nomic assets, and surviving war- time networks. Some of the most popular 
and widely used definitions of corruption can appear tantalisingly simple 
and clear, masking a more complex and contested reality. Thus, both the 
World Bank’s (1997a) classic definition of corruption as ‘the abuse of 
public power for private gain’, or Transparency International’s ‘the misuse 
of entrusted power for private gain’,2 have been popular with donor agen-
cies, not only because they are relatively broad definitions that capture a 
wide range of corrupt practices, but possibly also because they suggest that 
corrupt behaviour can be easily identified, classified and addressed 
through neat institutional solutions. The analysis in this volume, however, 
suggests that such broad understandings of corruption not only under-
mine the analytical usefulness of the term, but they also make the develop-
ment of effective peacebuilding policies more difficult. While the many 
different social problems often subsumed under the label ‘corruption’ 
could challenge a peaceful and prosperous order, each one requires a dis-
tinct response and cannot be understood through the same conceptual 
lens and addressed using the same instruments.
 Defining corruption is also complicated by the fact that as a social 
concept, its content changes across different social and cultural contexts. 
Practices that are considered corrupt in some countries might be con-
sidered as proper and legitimate in others. For example, in some coun-
tries, there are societal expectations of an office holder which arise from 
family or kinship ties; and some actions, even if they are popularly 
described and regarded as ‘corrupt’, constitute an essential part of social 
and political life (Jordan- Smith 2009; Blundo and de Sardan 2006). As 
James Scott (1969) and other anthropologists have argued, most con-
temporary understandings of corruption require a clear and well- 
established distinction between private and public spheres with public 
authority organised and legitimised along the lines of Weberian legal- 
rational authority (for an overview, see Sissener 2001). Where alternative 
sources of political authority, in particular authority based on traditions of 
kinship, are competing with state institutions, and the distinctions between 
public and private are blurred, corruption is more difficult to identify, as 
public and private duties often overlap. The difficulty of comparing cases 
and developing policy prescriptions becomes plain when there is not even 
agreement on the content of the basic concept under discussion.
 Despite this recognition of the cultural specificity of the content of cor-
ruption, a range of scholars have identified what Mark Philp in his contri-
bution to this volume has called an ‘objective core’ of corruption that can 
help to capture the essence of the concept across different social contexts. 
Philp suggests that common to all understandings of corruption is its sub-
version of norms and rules governing public office. Similarly, Wayne Sand-
holtz and William Koetzle (2000: 34–35) identify three core elements of 
corruption:
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Selling the peace?  5
•	 Corruption	 relies	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 well-	developed	 distinction	
between the public and private sphere, which breaks down in cases of 
corruption.
•	 Corruption	involves	administrative	or	political	favours	in	exchange	for	
inducements, which can be financial, but can also take other forms, 
not least the form of refraining from violence against the official or 
politician providing the favour.3
•	 Corruption	involves	a	violation	of	shared	norms	of	public	office.
While such an approach to defining corruption does not get around the 
problem that different actors can have different perceptions of whether 
an act is corrupt or not based on varying societal and cultural norms (as 
exist between intervenors and local populations), this approach does 
suggest that a qualified systematic and comparative analysis of corruption 
is possible.
 An alternative path to defining corruption focuses not on its struc-
ture, but argues that what distinguishes corruption from other forms of 
malfeasance is that it is a moral concept. Laura Underkuffler (2009: 37), 
for example, claims that what is missing from most definitions of corrup-
tion is that it ‘is an explicitly moral notion; corruption describes, in 
general parlance, a powerful, all- consuming evil’. There are several 
problems with such an approach. First, it suggests the existence of a set 
of universal norms that corruption violates. The existence of such a 
strong normative consensus on the content of corruption, however, is 
doubtful. Second, and equally important, such a moral approach 
deprives us of analytical focus and precision. It excludes a priori the pos-
sibility that different forms of corruption might be harmful in different 
ways and to different degrees; or that corruption might even be bene-
ficial, if only in the short term, and at a certain cost, for example by sus-
taining a relatively stable order that might be unequal and unjust, but 
which minimises violence (see for example Nye 1967: 420; see also the 
contributions by Goodhand, Le Billon, Philp and Reno in this volume). 
It also ignores the possibility that corruption might be a very rational 
response to the situation within which individuals find themselves, and 
be a central part of their coping and survival strategies (see Philp in this 
volume; Goodhand 2004). Third, such a conceptualisation of corruption 
brings with it major problems for peacebuilding policy. While post- 
conflict environments appear to be especially prone to corruption, and 
while corruption can compromise peacebuilding efforts, fighting cor-
ruption is not the only objective of peacebuilding actors – nor is it 
necessarily the most important one. Enabling corruption might be a 
price peacebuilders have to pay to ensure the participation of warring 
factions in a peace agreement and to end large- scale violence. If corrup-
tion were to be seen as an ‘all- consuming evil’, akin to genocide, rape 
and other war crimes, it is difficult to see how such trade- offs could ever 
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be morally justified. Peacebuilding involves difficult political and moral 
choices, and by turning corruption into an absolute moral question, it 
effectively becomes impossible to prioritise amongst different peace-
building objectives.
Differentiating forms of corruption
In light of the complexity of the concept of corruption, one way to 
improve the understanding of its consequences for peacebuilding efforts 
is to distinguish between different forms of corruption. Three possible 
ways of refining the concept stand out: first, by contrasting grand and 
petty corruption; second, by differentiating corruption across sectors; and 
third, by examining different practices classed as being corrupt.
 One of the most common distinctions that is made in the literature and 
by policymakers is between ‘grand’ and ‘petty’ corruption, at times also 
referred to as political and administrative corruption (Andvig et al. 2001: 
10–12), or as state capture and administrative corruption (World Bank 
2000b). Despite the misleading terminology, the grand–petty distinction is 
not concerned with the scale of corrupt activity, but rather the level at 
which it takes place – either in the political leadership, or the bureaucracy 
that implements and administers policy. While the former has undoubt-
edly had a greater impact on the practices and functioning of the political 
system because it sustains networks of patronage and distorts the laws and 
procedures of government (rather than just their implementation), it is 
petty corruption that is experienced more directly by the population in its 
daily interactions with the state, for example through favours granted and 
bribes paid regularly to officials (Delesgues and Torabi 2010). While the 
impact of these individual acts of corruption on the overall peacebuilding 
process may be minimal, it undermines citizens’ trust in the state. Addi-
tionally, petty corruption can become a vehicle for targeting ethnic and 
political groups; in this way, the routine nature of petty corruption can 
destroy the perception of state neutrality.
 The second way to refine the analysis of corruption is to distinguish 
between corruption in different sectors (justice, security, procurement) as 
they differ in importance between different post- conflict countries. In 
jurisdictions with substantial natural resources such as oil or diamonds, 
corruption in the regulation of these sectors and the trade in these com-
modities is likely to be a central challenge to peacebuilding efforts (see 
Gillies and Dykstra in this volume; Le Billon and Levin 2009; Ross 2004). 
In countries without substantial natural resources, such as Kosovo, govern-
ment procurement and control of publicly- owned enterprises are key sites 
of corruption (Kosovar Stability Initiative 2010).
 In many post- conflict countries, it is the police and the justice system 
which are weak and often perceived to be among the most corrupt institu-
tions.4 Corruption in these sectors is particularly problematic as it creates 
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Selling the peace?  7
the (often justified) perception that some groups or individuals can act 
with impunity. This limits trust in the state and creates a sense of insecu-
rity, thereby undermining peacebuilding efforts. In the aftermath of the 
1999 war in Kosovo, for example, Albanian judges and prosecutors dis-
played a strong bias in favour of Albanians and against ethnic minorities, 
especially Serbs. While minorities could barely get a fair trial (sometimes 
facing detention without charges), former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
members literally got away with murder – a situation tacitly condoned by 
parts of the Kosovar political leadership (Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights 1999; O’Neill 2002). Importantly, the reason for this behaviour was 
not financial gain but threats of violence against judges and prosecutors 
by former fighters from the KLA, and a more general perception among 
elements of the Kosovar- Albanian elite that the judiciary was simply an 
instrument to promote the goal of independence.
 Finally, one can distinguish between different practices classified as cor-
ruption. The UNODCCP distinguishes between eight different forms of 
corruption: fraud, illegal political bargains, embezzlement, bribery, favour-
itism, extortion, the abuse of discretion and conflicts of interest 
(UNODCCP 2002). Andvig et al. (2001: 8–10) limit themselves to five main 
forms of corruption – bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion and favour-
itism; while Giorgio Blundo and Olivier de Sardan identify seven basic 
forms of corruption from a detailed comparative study of corruption in 
West Africa (Blundo and Sardan 2006). These include commissions for 
illicit services, unwarranted payment for public services, gratuities, string- 
pulling, levies and tolls, sidelining and misappropriation. Broadly, these 
different lists agree on the kinds of practices that constitute corruption, 
but importantly many of them, such as favouritism, the abuse of discre-
tion, or string- pulling can only be meaningfully examined and judged in 
their specific social context. Therefore, focusing on different forms of cor-
ruption does not avoid the pitfalls of specific societal understandings of 
the concept. It can help, however, with analysing the specific pathways of 
corruption in different post- conflict environments, and their impact on 
peacebuilding efforts.
The impact of corruption on peacebuilding outcomes
There is a common assumption that corruption has a negative impact on 
peacebuilding and statebuilding outcomes (i.e. Doig and Tisne 2009). 
Indeed, the harmful impact of corruption on peacebuilding and recon-
struction has been a dominant discourse amongst policy makers and in 
the media (see for example (CNN 2008; Cockburn 2009; Rubin 2009; PBS 
Newshour 2010), in particular with regard to Afghanistan and Iraq. Much 
of the general scholarly literature on corruption further underscores its 
harmful effects (see for example Mauro 1997a; Rose- Ackerman 1999; 
Heineman and Heimann 2006; Uslaner 2008).
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 There is no doubt about the substantial social and economic costs of cor-
ruption, such as lower economic growth (Mauro 1995; Kaufmann and Kray 
2002), increased cost of capital for firms (Kaufmann and Kray 2002), and 
growing inequality (Glaeser et al. 2003). In addition, corruption has been 
associated with the undermining of trust in society (Seligson 2002; Uslaner 
2002), the increase in political instability (Mo 2001), how citizens feel about 
the performance of their democracy (Anderson and Tverdova 2003), and 
the entrenchment of patronage networks and wartime elites (Cheng 2011).
 Despite the fact that corruption poses a strong threat to economic 
development, political stability, good governance and state legitimacy, in 
post- conflict countries the costs of corruption need to be seen in the wider 
context of peacebuilding, and the additional competing priorities that 
arise from such environments. As many of the contributions to this volume 
highlight, inquiries into the impact of corruption on transitions from war 
to peace require a more nuanced discussion that acknowledges the diffi-
cult trade- offs that need to be made in a peacebuilding context. In evalu-
ating the impact of corruption, this discussion will take these priorities 
into account to argue for a more nuanced understanding of the impact of 
corruption on peacebuilding outcomes. Corruption can have limited 
positive effects on peacebuilding through facilitating the ‘purchase of 
peace’ and in its redistributive effects. However, these positive short- term 
effects are accompanied by a high long- term price because ultimately, the 
legitimacy of a post- war state and the health of its political institutions are 
likely to be undermined by corruption.
Ending violence and cementing peace
To bring an end to the fighting, peace agreements and power- sharing 
arrangements that implicitly allow for corruption may be a necessary, if 
unpalatable feature of peacebuilding. Recent research has suggested that 
creating institutions that incorporate power- sharing between rival factions 
helps to resolve the security dilemma that arises at the end of war when fac-
tions are still mistrustful of each other (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007), and that 
power- sharing can help to build trust between warring parties and contrib-
ute to a more enduring peace.5 In some post- conflict settlements, it has 
been the opportunities for corruption and patronage that were negotiated 
as part of the power- sharing agreements that have literally helped to ‘buy 
out’ potential spoilers in a conflict. Faced not only with the calamity of war, 
but also enormous pressures to put an end to it, the goal of international 
actors is usually to negotiate a settlement that ends the violence as quickly as 
possible. However, in these situations, there was also a tacit understanding 
that officeholders would be permitted to exploit the economic opportun-
ities provided by government positions. The economic benefits arising to 
participants in power- sharing agreements have included assuming control 
of state resources, building patronage networks and political power 
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Selling the peace?  9
structures (see Belloni, this volume), allowing illicit economic activities to 
continue (Cheng 2011), and being able to extract bribes in the awarding of 
public contracts or concessions (Galtung and Tisne 2007).6 However, reach-
ing a deal could mean accepting that the opportunities offered by a settle-
ment could be exploited by corrupt actors. The situation in Liberia, as 
discussed by William Reno in this volume, is an important case in point.
 The conclusion of the Liberian civil war resulted in the divvying up of 
cabinet positions between the three warring factions which effectively gave 
them a two- year period to reap the full economic benefits of holding offi-
cial positions. Western diplomats made this trade- off consciously because 
they felt that it was the only way to bring an end to the civil war.7 Corrup-
tion was a price that Western negotiators were willing to pay given the 
number of people who were being killed at the time. The fact that Liberi-
ans were piling up corpses in front of the American Embassy in Monrovia 
sent a clear message to Western negotiators: do whatever you need to do 
to end this war immediately. Thus, the first goal of the international com-
munity was to stop the fighting.
 When it comes to the implementation of peace agreements, interna-
tional actors tend to prioritise stability over ambitious governance reforms, 
even if there is a substantial long- term cost of doing so for the post- conflict 
country (Barnett and Zürcher 2009). The problem, as William Reno 
points out (p. 000), is that international actors do not have any appetite 
for genuine political reform if it includes the risk of further destabilising 
the country; instead, the international community ‘may tolerate the incor-
poration of elements of patrimonial politics with only partial reform’.
 Even after a settlement is reached and a country has entered the ‘post- 
conflict’ stage, accepting corruption can still have useful stabilising effects. 
In 2005, for example, when the governor of Helmand province in Afghan-
istan, Sher Muhammad Akhunzada, was found with nine tons of opium 
and heroin in his basement, the British government (whose forces were 
deployed in Helmand) pressured President Hamid Karzai to dismiss the 
governor from his post. However, with his departure the security situation 
in the province deteriorated dramatically, especially after he directed 
3,000 of his followers to join the Taliban when he could no longer pay 
their wages (McElroy 2009). While Akhunzada’s dismissal was not the only 
factor that contributed to increased violence in Helmand, both Karzai and 
observers in the United Kingdom have argued that his departure played a 
critical role in the deterioration of security in the province (Nelson 2008; 
Lloyd 2008). The Akhunzada quandary suggests that Britain paid a high 
price for its anti- corruption and anti- narcotics stance.
 This example illustrates why donors place such a premium on stability. 
It also illustrates how stabilisation as a priority has made donors’ inten-
tions to crack down on corruption much less credible: those engaged in 
corruption know that international actors would much rather co- opt 
potential peace spoilers than confront them and risk a return to violence. 
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Thus, one unintended consequence of ‘buying’ the peace is that interna-
tional actors have typically condoned the institutionalisation of corruption 
because of overriding concerns about stability (see also Keen 2000). The 
other problem with ‘buying’ the peace is that it is difficult to know what 
exactly is being bought. Returning to the Afghanistan example, the con-
sequences of ceding control of wide swaths of the country to be ruled by 
corrupt local leaders in the aftermath of the 2001 invasion may have ulti-
mately been the undoing of Western military operations in the country.
 There are other potentially dangerous consequences of such an 
approach. The prospect of sharing in a ‘peace dividend’ can spark the 
proliferation of armed groups who seek to be included in the peace agree-
ment, as happened for example in Burundi (Uvin and Bayer 2011). Sim-
ilarly, factions (both the leadership and ordinary ‘foot- soldiers’) feeling 
that they are not getting their fair share of the peace dividend might resort 
to violence to enhance their bargaining position, thereby destabilising the 
political situation and even leading the country back to war.
Redistributive effects
Corruption can also have a stabilising effect in another way: through its 
local redistributive effects. In countries where patronage politics structure 
political relationships and interactions, these structures can also be stabil-
ising if managed well (see, for example, Reno 1995), no matter how objec-
tionable they may seem to international peacebuilders. When the proceeds 
of corruption flow through these networks during a period of political 
instability, then these funds can be used to cement loyalties and relation-
ships which can, in turn, help to stabilise the emerging post- war order. 
The key to this reasoning hinges on how widely and deeply the benefits 
are redistributed and whether this redistribution can be linked to the 
broader social order. The latter depends on the particular local norms of 
public office and citizens’ expectations of office holders (Jordan- Smith 
2009). For example, if a significant sum from an important bribe is redis-
tributed widely through political patronage networks, then the redistribu-
tion of these funds should serve to strengthen an existing political order. 
Certainly, if the proceeds of a bribe are not redistributed, the effects can 
be violent. An example from Liberia illustrates this tension. The manage-
ment of the Sinoe Rubber Plantation, one of Liberia’s largest, had histori-
cally been a contentious issue for local residents. When the war ended, 
RUBREMICCI, the company that officially held the management contract 
was eager to evacuate those who were illegally occupying the plantation. 
The company allegedly offered three key individuals a bribe to buy their 
cooperation. One of these three individuals (Paulson Garteh) reportedly 
returned and shared his bribe with the community, turning himself into a 
local hero in the process. The other two people, who chose not to share 
their bribes, were rumoured to have received death threats from 
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Selling the peace?  11
community members (UNMIL 2005a). This example illustrates that while 
corruption in itself is an important consideration, the question of whether 
a bribe is retained solely by the individual who receives it or whether it is 
redistributed locally can affect peacebuilding outcomes.
 The Liberian example reveals that relying on corruption to lead to sta-
bilising redistributive effects is a risky proposition. In his chapter, Philippe 
Le Billon points out that as ‘groups empowered by the outcome of the war 
continue to sustain dominant political and economic positions through 
corruption, they may prevent the redistribution of power by stifling insti-
tutional checks and balances’ (p. 000). As a result, inequalities become 
entrenched and could give rise to new grievances and sources of conflict 
between and within groups. You and Khagram (2005) argue that these 
types of entrenched inequalities create vicious cycles which are difficult to 
break out of because inequality creates a greater social tolerance for cor-
ruption, which in turn further reinforces inequality. While this particular 
dynamic may not result in an immediate return to war, the quality of 
peacebuilding outcomes will certainly suffer.
Corrosive effects
While corruption can have stabilising effects in the short term, researchers 
generally agree that its long- term impact is overwhelmingly negative. Thus, 
in most peacebuilding contexts there is an implicit trade- off whereby cor-
ruption is tolerated in the short- term in order to end violence and aid 
stability, but the foundations for long- term development of state institu-
tions are undermined as the capacity and legitimacy of the state suffer 
damage. These effects are corrosive in nature; they affect people’s percep-
tions of the state, creating expectations of corruption and bribery not only 
at the highest levels of government, but throughout a state’s institutions. 
Once people’s expectations are gradually recalibrated to anticipate 
corrupt interactions, these norms of corruption will perpetuate them-
selves. If one takes the long view, it is possible to see how the institutionali-
sation of these interactions can lead to deeply- entrenched patterns of state 
corruption as described in several studies of African politics (Bayart 1989; 
Bayart et al. 1999; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Jordan- Smith 2009). As the state 
comes to be seen as increasingly predatory, corruption becomes a rational 
response to the context. Uslaner suggests that where there is a culture of 
corruption, ‘people make payments because there is no way out’ (2008: 
6). These attitudes are further reinforced when civil servants take their 
cues on the integrity of holding public office from politicians and senior 
officials who regularly accept bribes. As people come to perceive their 
officials as generally corrupt, it becomes correspondingly difficult in the 
aftermath of conflict to re- establish trust in government. Citizens lose faith 
in the justness of their institutions and turn to non- state mechanisms to 
meet their needs. Escaping this cycle becomes all the more difficult 
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because citizens are more likely to disengage from the political process 
once they believe these institutions have been compromised (Seligson 
2002; Anderson and Tverdova 2003).
 In environments rife with corruption, the problems accompanying 
political self- selection become further amplified: corruption becomes 
central to the maintenance of patronage networks on which political 
power is based, making it difficult for those without such networks to 
compete for power, and potentially dangerous for those who want to fight 
corruption to do so. In the extreme, there is a danger that those who are 
benefiting from corruption will exploit their position by using state 
resources to violently defend their patronage networks. Even in a demo-
cratic system, any outsider entering electoral competition would need suf-
ficient financial resources to campaign against those who are part of the 
corrupt system; this dynamic then makes getting elected an even more 
expensive proposition which further fuels corruption. Thus, when a gov-
ernment’s reputation for corruption starts to affect the selection of polit-
ical leaders, the quality of political leadership will decline.
The impact of peacebuilding on corruption
The international community can play a critical role in the post- conflict 
transition process of most states, especially by sustaining peace operations 
and through its funding of humanitarian and development assistance. 
While the involvement of international actors shapes the post- war environ-
ment, it also structures opportunities for corruption. Thus, to understand 
the character of corruption in post- conflict countries and its impact on 
peacebuilding operations, and to be able to develop strategies to contain 
it, it is critical to fully understand how contemporary peacebuilding pol-
icies and practices can fuel it. Ultimately, these policies and practices are 
under the control of international peacebuilding actors and can be 
changed if they encourage corruption; in contrast, peacebuilders have 
little influence over corrupt practices of local elites, in particular if they 
are rooted in local culture or tradition.
 This section examines five key dimensions of contemporary peacebuild-
ing that have further fuelled or entrenched corruption. These factors are 
deeply entrenched in how the international community provides assist-
ance to post- conflict countries and are extremely difficult, if not imposs-
ible, to change. They include the rapid disbursal of aid in the immediate 
aftermath of conflict, the reliance on local partners in the implementation 
of peacebuilding efforts, the primacy of stability, the dominance of 
counter- terrorism policies and peacebuilders’ emphasis on democratisa-
tion, in particular the holding of elections soon after the end of a war. 
This section ends with a discussion of several peacebuilding practices and 
policies that should mitigate corruption and could realistically be imple-
mented by any individual donor state.
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The early and rapid disbursement of aid
As von Billerbeck highlights in her chapter in this volume, the rapid 
inflow of large amounts of aid, with the economic distortions that it 
involves, and the rent- seeking opportunities it offers, ‘makes post- conflict 
settings rife with opportunities for corruption’ (p. 000). While external 
assistance is needed, these funds usually cannot be fully absorbed immedi-
ately after the signing of a peace agreement (Collier and Hoeffler 2004b). 
Given that there is more aid money than capacity to absorb it, the ‘excess’ 
money is more likely to be misspent, creating greater scope for 
corruption.
 Often, the amounts of money that are brought in as a result of peace-
keeping missions and humanitarian aid are so large relative to the local 
economy that peacebuilding itself becomes a local industry (Ignatieff 
2002). For example, in 2004–2005, the budget for Liberia’s peacekeeping 
mission was set at US$865 million – this amount dwarfed the country’s 
official GDP which was approximately US$511 million.8 This figure does 
not even include any form of bilateral or regional aid, nor does it include 
funds spent by any of the UN agencies. After years of conflict, it is easy to 
see how the arrival of the international community can turn a fragile local 
economy upside down (Carnahan et al. 2006) and how opportunities for 
corruption are created.
 It is also worth noting that for the local population, the dollar amount 
of international assistance will be even larger after taking purchasing 
power parity into account. While an expatriate NGO worker or UN pro-
gramme officer, for example might not consider US$5,000 or US$10,000 
to be huge amounts of money, in many post- conflict countries, this 
amount could be enough to buy a plot of land and build a respectable 
family house. Amounts that seem insignificant as part of multi- million 
dollar aid projects actually loom large over local livelihoods: having an 
opportunity to secure one’s future, pay for medical treatment for loved 
ones, or guarantee access to higher education for one’s children makes 
corruption much more tempting. Indeed, the amounts of money that the 
international community brings with it to a post- conflict environment are 
so large that some observers have argued that in the case of Afghanistan, 
there is now a strong incentive to maintain an environment of insecurity 
because so much of the local economy is dependent on the flow of inter-
national assistance (Wilder and Gordon 2009).
 Analysts have argued that the problem of corruption associated with 
development aid could be addressed by gradually phasing aid in and 
building it up over several years as the capacity of a post- conflict govern-
ment increases (i.e. Collier and Hoeffler 2004b). However, the reality is 
that there is only a limited window of time for raising large amounts of aid 
after a conflict comes to a formal end, as other crises soon capture the 
attention of donors. Moreover, in the case of humanitarian aid, quick 
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delivery is prioritised, as people’s lives are at stake.9 However, time pres-
sure also creates opportunities for corruption. In some cases, if ‘speed 
money’ is not paid, then food and medical supplies are not delivered, con-
tainer cargo remains stuck in customs warehouses, and NGO operating 
licenses get stuck in red tape. When the situation is critical, international 
actors might feel compelled to make that payment, thereby fuelling an 
expectation that corruption is acceptable, feeding existing cultures of cor-
ruption and strengthening those actors who have the power to control 
access to those in need of humanitarian assistance (Shearer 2000). This 
sort of inconsistent behaviour signals to the political elite and the local 
population that donors are not serious about fighting corruption.
Reliance on local elites
While the relationship between external and local actors is often character-
ised by unequal power, dependency and the denial of local autonomy (Chan-
dler 2010), it is important to note that international peacebuilding actors are 
also highly dependent on the cooperation of local actors, especially elites. 
Establishing control over territory requires substantial military forces that 
intervenors are normally unwilling to provide and sustain, therefore local 
political elites need to be co- opted to sustain stability and to implement 
various peacebuilding objectives. However, for international peacebuilders, 
part of the price of co- opting local elites could mean a greater tolerance of 
local corruption. Successful peacebuilding and statebuilding relies also on 
local knowledge and support for establishing policies and institutions – some-
thing that external intervenors will inevitably lack. As local elites are likely to 
have interests that diverge from those of external peacebuilding actors (not 
least a keen interest in maintaining their power), this reliance leads to classic 
principal–agent problems, and in particular to the problem of information 
asymmetries, as local partners become gatekeepers, controlling the flow of 
aid money into the community ( Jackson 2005; Nakaya 2008).
 This type of information asymmetry creates opportunities for corrup-
tion: assistance can be re- directed from those in need to those who are 
loyal, and projects can be sub- contracted to cronies. The information 
asymmetries and the difficulties of monitoring these practices and under-
standing the complex social relations that fuel them reduce the risk of 
corrupt actors getting caught, and make it extremely challenging to elimi-
nate corruption from a post- conflict environment.
The primacy of stability
In a post- conflict situation, international actors are worried most about a 
country returning to war. Peacebuilders worry that renewed violence 
would threaten the legitimacy of peacebuilding efforts and the credibility 
of the organisations involved. As the political situation grows calmer and 
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the chance of war diminishes with each passing day, the stakes for keeping 
a country violence- free grow ever higher. This has often made peacebuild-
ing actors unwilling to tackle corruption amongst actors with a capacity for 
violence because they might directly threaten the peacebuilding process if 
the corrupt structures and practices sustaining their power or their wealth 
are challenged.
 This dynamic is evident in Kosovo where the EU Rule of Law Mission 
(EULEX) and the EU’s International Civilian Office (ICO) have allowed 
parallel authority structures to persist in the Serb- populated north of the 
country even though these structures are widely acknowledged to be rife 
with corruption and associated with organised crime elements. Similarly, 
EULEX and the ICO have been mostly unwilling to confront notoriously 
corrupt members of the Kosovo Albanian political elite for fear that their 
arrest and prosecution could lead them to mobilise violent protest.
Counter- terrorism
In Afghanistan and Iraq, the prioritisation of counterterrorism and counter-
insurgency over peacebuilding and statebuilding has come at the expense 
of safeguarding the power of all those who are willing to fight al Qaeda, the 
Taliban, and any other ‘terrorist’ group, and a tacit acceptance of their 
often corrupt behaviour. A financial crisis at the largest bank in Afghanistan 
illustrates how the counterterrorism imperative competes with corruption 
concerns. In January 2011, experts warned about the potential collapse of 
Afghanistan’s banking system, as Kabul Bank tried to cope with potential 
losses of US$900 million resulting from fraud, mismanagement and corrup-
tion. Contributing to these losses were loans and grants made to govern-
ment ministers, as well as millions of dollars spent by the bank on helping to 
re- elect President Karzai (Rubin 2009). Importantly, US State Department 
cables released by WikiLeaks reveal that both Afghan and Western regula-
tors knew broadly about the massive fraud and corruption problems but 
chose to concentrate their attention on terrorist financing. Addressing cor-
ruption was not a priority, even though it undermined the legitimacy and 
stability of the central government. The emphasis on counterterrorism has 
also permitted key public figures central to counterterrorism efforts in 
Afghanistan to enrich themselves by exploiting their public positions.
Democratisation and early elections
The establishment of democratic institutions has been a central pillar of 
international peacebuilding efforts. Specific elements of post- war democrat-
isation, in particular the holding of elections early in the post- war period, 
have been criticised for fuelling violence and entrenching and democra t-
ically legitimising war- time elites (Carothers 2007; Paris 2004; and Snyder 
2000). Democratisation, and in particular early elections, however, can also 
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fuel and entrench corruption. Studies show that clientelistic politics, the 
increased ability of rent- seekers to access public officials, and weak institu-
tional checks and balances associated with democratisation processes all 
increase opportunities for corruption and reduce the risk of getting caught 
(Rock 2007). In addition, rapid democratisation in post- conflict countries 
can lead to what Paul Collier has termed the ‘selection effect’,10 whereby the 
most corrupt individuals end up controlling government. The reasoning is 
simple: electoral campaigns require money, and those most able to fund 
such campaigns in the aftermath of civil war are also the people who are 
most likely to be powerful and corrupt.11 The result is government leader-
ship that tends toward corruption, and an electoral process that is likely to 
entrench and democratically legitimise war- time elites.
 In light of this dynamic, it might be tempting to call for the postpone-
ment of elections to create opportunities for the emergence of a more 
diverse range of political candidates (including non- corrupt ones). 
However, this argument ignores the fact that it is often very difficult for 
external actors to postpone elections. There is usually strong popular 
demand for elections (as highlighted by the high voter turnouts that often 
characterise the first post- conflict election in a country). Also, promoting 
democratic governance is central to the legitimacy of peacebuilding inter-
ventions; denying or significantly delaying elections would undermine the 
legitimacy of external peacebuilding actors and their practices. Who, in 
the absence of elections, would have the legitimacy to govern (Reilly 2004; 
Zaum 2007)? Thus, the politics of sovereignty and legitimacy often make it 
unfeasible to significantly delay elections.
 Nevertheless, international peacebuilders could do more to level the 
electoral playing field, facilitate the emergence of non- corrupt actors, and 
discourage corrupt behaviour during the election campaign. This could 
include laws to control the financing of political parties and election cam-
paigns, as suggested by the head of Iraq’s Commission on Integrity (Karim 
2011); the provision of free media coverage (e.g. via UN radio and TV sta-
tions) to all serious candidates; supporting the development of political 
parties with programmatic agendas (as opposed to parties based on ethni-
city or individuals); and pushing for independent national electoral com-
missions with robust powers.
Mitigating corruption
Some of the ways in which international peacebuilding is currently organ-
ised makes it difficult to entirely eliminate corruption. However, some 
international peacebuilding practices could be altered or better managed 
to reduce corruption. This section briefly examines several practices that, 
with some effort, can realistically be changed to mitigate corruption.
 The first issue is the poor monitoring of donor- funded projects by 
donors. Donors do a poor job of monitoring their money and evaluating 
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whether the intended objectives have been achieved. In part, this is because 
development projects are often sub- contracted out to local NGOs by donor 
agencies; making accurate monitoring of progress and assessing outcomes 
more difficult. The information asymmetries arising from this makes cor-
ruption more tempting because the agent has a lower risk of getting caught. 
The problem is compounded when donors hire international NGOs who in 
turn hire local NGOs, creating a nested principal–agent problem.
 In Afghanistan and Iraq, the general problem of poor monitoring has 
been exacerbated by the decision to conduct many transactions on a cash 
basis. This has resulted in unbureaucratic practices which vastly increased 
the opportunities for corruption, fraud and waste. For example, Stuart W. 
Bowen Jr., the United State’s Special Inspector- General for Iraq Reconstruc-
tion, has written about how the US government’s Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) was conducting official business using duffel bags full of 
cash in January 2004 (DeYoung and Pincus 2009). Bowen referred to the 
mismanagement of US$50 billion of reconstruction money as resembling 
the work of a giant ‘ad hoc- racy’ (ibid.).
 However, the problem can be mitigated to some extent through effective 
monitoring and evaluation. Despite the fact that outsourcing to local part-
ners increases the likelihood of funds being misspent, donors often deliber-
ately choose not to expend resources and effort on monitoring their 
projects. For example, a field experiment conducted by Ben Olken (2007) 
demonstrated that for a World Bank road- building project, informing 
project managers that the central government would audit all of the projects 
(instead of just 4 per cent of projects) and then making the results of the 
audit public at a village meeting actually reduced corruption by 8 per cent 
in highly- corrupt Indonesia. This result suggests that top- down audits com-
bined with the threat of social sanctions can have a powerful effect, yet most 
donors have chosen not to invest their resources in this way.
 The second issue concerns donor states’ own departmental budget 
practices. Typically, budgets are set annually and funds that have been 
allocated to a particular line item must be spent by the end of the fiscal 
year. If there is any unspent money, then that particular line item is likely 
to be reduced by the unspent amount in the budget for the following year. 
For a programme officer in a donor state, the goal is to give the money 
away and get it out the door; she is evaluated on whether that money is 
spent, not on the impact that the money has had. Ultimately, the officer 
does not want her budget to be cut so there is pressure to turn a blind eye 
if and when corruption, fraud and waste become problematic. Given com-
peting demands on her time, she has little incentive to follow up and be 
seen within her organisation as a ‘troublemaker’. If donors were to change 
how internal budgets are set each year and how programme officers are 
evaluated, this should help mitigate corruption.
 Finally, the international community does not have a strong record when 
it comes to punishing governments, or even local partners, for acts of 
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corruption (but see Dwan and Bailey 2006). Organisations are rarely held to 
account and there are few repercussions for the individuals responsible for 
project implementation or project monitoring. There are a variety of factors 
which contribute to this poor record. From a practical perspective, there is 
usually no point in trying to prosecute the individual given that the judicial 
system in a post- conflict state is unlikely to be functioning properly. Because 
donors, IOs and NGOs are concerned about the implications for their repu-
tations (both domestic and international) that would accompany any hint of 
corruption on their projects, they are also unlikely to press charges or make 
public the inadequacy of their monitoring systems. Finally, irrespective of 
corruption, international actors will need to continue working with these 
organisations and individuals because the alternatives are limited; they 
cannot afford to lose access to critical local partners so it becomes easier to 
stay silent. For these reasons, those who work directly for international peace-
building actors and are caught accepting or demanding bribes are usually 
dismissed from their position with no further consequences; for local part-
ners found to be corrupt, all that donors can realistically do is to exclude 
them from a specific project.
 The fact that international peacebuilders are unwilling or unable to insti-
tute any kind of meaningful deterrent makes engaging in corruption a low- 
risk, high- reward activity. Research by Alesina and Weder (2002), for 
example, finds that at the macro- level, there is no evidence that despite some 
variation between donors, less corrupt countries receive more bilateral or 
multilateral aid. While donor rhetoric has heavily promoted transparency, 
good governance and anti- corruption efforts, donor behaviour has shown that 
corruption levels do not, on the whole, affect levels of development 
assistance.12
 Peacebuilders have often structured the environment in ways that have 
facilitated corruption. While some amount of corruption is inevitable in a 
post- conflict setting, peacebuilding actors can still control how and when 
they disburse aid; they can choose who to partner with and institute appro-
priate deterrents; and they can change their policy priorities. As discussed, 
the premium placed on stability, the emphasis on early elections, and the 
dominance of the counterterrorism agenda each contribute to a permissive 
environment where corruption is more likely to thrive. These factors are 
under the control of international actors. Yet until donors credibly signal 
that corruption really matters, the rhetoric on corruption will not be taken 
seriously by local partners.
Obstacles to anti- corruption efforts and peacebuilding 
operations
As the case studies and chapters show, anti- corruption efforts in post- 
conflict countries have focused on strengthening state capacity; on increas-
ing transparency in decision- making, especially in spending decisions; and 
067 01 Corruption 01.indd   18 3/6/11   13:43:41
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Selling the peace?  19
on the accountability of public actors, through both formal and informal 
monitoring processes. However, despite the substantial resources dedic-
ated to these efforts, the impact on corruption has been limited, with most 
post- conflict countries lingering at the bottom of global corruption and 
governance indices. Looking at some of the characteristics of international 
anti- corruption efforts in peacebuilding operations can shed some light 
on why corruption has remained such a problem. Four issues stand out: 
internationalising governance functions; an emphasis on formal institu-
tions; a focus on host- state institutions; and a reliance on executive fiat.
The internationalisation of governance functions
A substantial number of peacebuilding operations have witnessed the 
internationalisation of governance functions, either comprehensively, as 
with international transitional administrations in Kosovo or East Timor 
(Caplan 2005; Zaum 2007) or the CPA in Iraq (Fox 2008), or more selec-
tively, with internationals controlling the police, budgetary powers, or the 
justice system. Examples of the latter include the Governance and Eco-
nomic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) in Liberia that intro-
duced international experts with co- signature authority into key ministries 
and public enterprises to enhance transparency and accountability, espe-
cially with regard to revenue collection, procurement and spending 
decisions (see Reno’s chapter in this volume); or the EU’s Rule of Law 
Mission EULEX in Kosovo, whose international police force, judges and 
prosecutors have the authority to investigate and prosecute corruption 
cases (Zaum 2009).
 While aiming to enhance transparency and accountability, such inter-
nationalised set- ups also aim to strengthen the capacity of these institu-
tions and train local officials. In some respects, such mechanisms have 
been quite successful: GEMAP contributed to a tripling in Liberian tax 
revenues, while EULEX has begun to investigate a senior government 
minister and popular former commander of the KLA for corruption asso-
ciated with road building. However, all such mechanisms face obvious 
problems of sustainability, for if they fail to address the underlying organi-
sation of corruption and the social and economic structures that fuel it, 
corrupt actors can simply choose to wait out the international presence. 
Because of the fact that these types of intrusive anti- corruption mechan-
isms compromise norms of sovereignty and self- governance, they can be 
politically costly to maintain and fuel local resistance to the wider interna-
tional peacebuilding effort.13
Focus on formal institutions
In their anti- corruption efforts, peacebuilding operations have focused on 
building and strengthening formal anti- corruption institutions, such as 
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anti- corruption commissions (ACCs) (see Heilbrunn’s chapter in this 
volume), the judiciary, and procurement systems based on international 
best practices. However, these efforts often fall short as anti- corruption 
institutions are insufficiently resourced and insulated from political influ-
ence. As John Heilbrunn highlights in his chapter, ACCs can only be 
effective if they have strong political support, have adequate financial 
resources, and are given a strong official mandate. However, it is rarely in 
the interests of local elites to establish independent and well- resourced 
institutions that threaten the networks that sustain their power. In Kosovo, 
for example, the anti- corruption agency has lacked substantial political 
support, and has been starved of funds: with a budget of merely half a 
million euro and a small staff it has no capacity to investigate corruption 
allegations (Kosovar Stability Initiative 2010: 19).
 In addition, the focus on strengthening anti- corruption institutions is 
rooted in the idea that weak formal institutions fuel corruption. However, 
as the case studies show, corruption in post- conflict countries is also the 
consequence of concomitant informal power structures that fuel and 
shape relationships of corruption. Such efforts to strengthen formal insti-
tutions are rarely accompanied by similar efforts to weaken or co- opt these 
informal structures, limiting the impact of anti- corruption reforms, as 
highlighted in the chapters on Liberia and Sri Lanka.
Focus on host- state institutions
Peacebuilding operations tend to focus their anti- corruption efforts pre-
dominantly on the actions and institutions of the host state, rather than 
on the practices of public or private international actors such as busi-
nesses, NGOs, or international organisations. However, in post- conflict 
countries one cannot really understand – let alone successfully fight – cor-
ruption without attending to the role of international actors and struc-
tures. As discussed earlier, the scale of aid and the way in which it is 
disbursed, has important consequences for corruption (see also von Biller-
beck’s chapter). Similarly, the exploitation of natural resources and the 
networks of corruption that accompany it are inextricably linked to inter-
national markets. Yet, with a few notable exceptions, international anti- 
corruption efforts have focused predominantly on the role of the 
post- conflict state – despite the fact that external actors and structures play 
an important role.
 While there has been a strong campaign for greater transparency in aid 
programmes, some donors have been less than forthcoming in detailing 
how their aid money is spent. A recent assessment by the Publish What 
You Fund (PWYF ) campaign notes a glaring lack of primary data that 
would allow for comparisons between countries and programmes on how 
and where donors have allocated funds (PWYF 2010). While civil society 
has undertaken similar efforts through Publish What You Pay (PWYP) to 
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encourage transparency and accountability in the natural resource sector, 
Alexandra Gilles and Page Dykstra argue in their chapter that with the 
growing international competition for natural resources, the desire of 
Western governments to put pressure on their mining companies has 
declined. Instead, the emphasis has shifted to encouraging recipient devel-
oping country governments to be more transparent about their natural 
resource income under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI). On the other hand, as a consequence of an effective campaign by 
anti- corruption NGOs in the United States, the 2010 financial reform bill 
included provisions requiring resource extraction companies to disclose 
all payments made to governments for oil, gas or minerals. As the bill takes 
effect, it will become clearer whether these efforts to enhance transpar-
ency will have the desired effect on corruption.
Anti- corruption by executive fiat
In peacebuilding contexts where external actors exercise executive author-
ity, some of their envisaged anti- corruption measures were notable for 
their sweeping nature, and characterised by little regard for proper pro-
cedural safeguards, and in some instances, for flaunting rule of law princi-
ples. As such measures are often intended to demonstrate the decisiveness 
of either the government or of international actors, they run the risk of 
being based on simplified perceptions of the sources of corruption rather 
than a clear understanding of how corruption is actually working, and to 
compromise the very principles of good governance that peacebuilding 
actors purport to support. The lack of procedural safeguards and the 
scope of the actions can have important consequences for a country’s insti-
tutions. Two examples highlight the problems with these measures.
 The first relates to the judicial reform efforts in Bosnia and Herze-
govina (BiH), as described by Per Bergling in his chapter. When the ori-
ginal programme to weed out corrupt judges (based on complaints from 
the public and formal investigations into these complaints) yielded only 
seven dismissals of judges and prosecutors, the Office of the High Repre-
sentative replaced it with a new programme in 2002, requiring all judges 
and prosecutors to re- apply for their jobs. This reversed the burden of 
proof on the individual applicants, even if they had been promised life 
tenure following a review of the judiciary two years earlier. As a report 
from the Independent Judicial Commission (staffed with international 
experts) noted with disarming honesty, the problem was that the original 
programme required ‘a certain amount of proof be produced to support a 
finding that a judge/prosecutor is not fit to hold office’ (Knaus and 
Martin 2003: 65). This kind of anti- corruption project did little to advance 
the rule of law, or to promote the general liberal democratic principles 
which the OHR and the wider international community have used to 
justify their presence and intervention in BiH. Not surprisingly, the 
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programme was widely criticised both locally and internationally, though 
some analysts note that it contributed to a decline in corruption in the 
justice system (see Per Bergling’s chapter in this volume).
 The second example concerns a proposal to reform the procurement 
system in Kosovo in 2010. Procurement had previously been identified by 
donors and local analysts alike as one of the key focal points of corruption 
in Kosovo (EC 2010). In 2010, leading government members proposed to 
address the problem by firing and replacing all procurement officers. For 
a while, this proposal had substantial support from major donor coun-
tries,14 but was ultimately abandoned. A closer analysis of the procurement 
system (2010) by the Kosovar Stability Initiative highlights that such a 
policy – had it been implemented – would actually have made corruption 
worse in the procurement system. The mass firing and replacement of the 
officers would have failed to address two important underlying factors con-
tributing to the corrupt character of the system: the poor quality and 
limited training of procurement officers, and their vulnerability to pres-
sure from local and national politicians. As civil servants, procurement 
officers should have been protected from the threat of political dismissal. 
However, local and central government agencies chose to ignore the exist-
ing legal framework, leaving procurement officers vulnerable to pressure, 
including threats of violence and in some cases, actual violence. Firing all 
of the procurement officers would only have reinforced their vulnerability 
to political pressure.
Conclusion
Ultimately, there is no simple way to summarise the relationship between 
corruption and peacebuilding; it is at once deep, complex and varied. 
Instead, we offer two concluding ideas.
 First, corruption is a political problem that requires a political solution; 
a technical approach will not succeed on its own. In practice, this means 
that establishing anti- corruption institutions and passing reforms are 
unlikely to be effective without real political support from both donors 
and post- conflict governments – no matter how well- funded they are or 
how well- designed the anti- corruption programme is. Corruption is diffi-
cult to tackle because there are underlying structural imperatives that 
make it a rational strategy in post- conflict societies. In the post- conflict 
context, the approach that is most likely to achieve long- term success is to 
embed anti- corruption reforms within efforts to create legitimate political 
institutions. Ideally, these two agendas should be seen as complementary; 
certainly, anti- corruption reforms will be more credible if the implement-
ing institution is also credible.
 Finally, corruption is a double- edged sword. It can be used in the short- 
term to craft a peace where the spoils of war are divided amongst the fight-
ing factions; in some cases, it may be the only way to provide the stability 
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needed to achieve other peacebuilding objectives. But in its tacit accept-
ance, it also sows the seeds for undermining the capacity and legitimacy of 
state institutions. The challenge is for international actors to balance the 
imperatives of putting an immediate end to the violence without under-
mining the sustainability of the long- term peace.
Organisation of the book
This book is divided into three Parts. The first Part addresses how corrup-
tion is conceptualised in a peacebuilding environment. Mark Philp begins 
this volume with a theoretical exploration of corruption and how a post- 
conflict environment can shape what is or is not considered corruption in 
different contexts. Susan Rose- Ackerman then examines in greater depth 
what corruption in a post- conflict government might look like and what 
needs to be done by domestic and international leaders to successfully 
achieve reforms. The next two chapters focus more directly on the impact 
of the international community; first, by examining how liberal peace-
building fosters corruption in Philippe Le Billon’s chapter, and then by 
analysing how international aid affects corruption in the domestic context 
in Sarah von Billerbeck’s chapter.
 The second Part consists of a series of case studies illustrating many of 
the peacebuilding dynamics identified in the first Part. The country cases 
highlight the contested character of corruption, and illustrate how factors 
such as culture and tradition, historical context, and human agency con-
tribute to the relationship between peacebuilding and corruption. In BiH, 
Michael Pugh and Boris Divjak discuss the persistence of informal local 
networks in the aftermath of the war; while Per Bergling examines how 
perceptions of local corruption gradually created the impetus for the 
wholesale firing of the Bosnian judiciary. William Reno takes a compara-
tive approach to analysing corruption in Liberia, contrasting its destabilis-
ing effects with the stabilising influence of corrupt networks in East Asia. 
In his chapter on Afghanistan, Jonathan Goodhand shows how corruption 
is deeply wrapped up with drug trafficking. Using the concept of joint 
extraction regimes, he argues that drugs and corruption have given the 
central government a degree of influence in the north that it does not 
have in the north. In the chapter on Iraq, Robert Looney focuses on how 
the disintegration of generalised trust played into the country’s political 
corruption. The final case study by Zachariah Mampilly takes a historical 
perspective to argue that the changes that occurred in Sri Lanka’s political 
economy during the civil war ultimately informed the nature of corrup-
tion in the post- conflict period.
 The third Part of the book focuses on anti- corruption measures. In his 
chapter on ACCs, John Heilbrunn suggests that these institutions, rather 
than offering a quick fix to corruption, can contribute to the consolida-
tion of anti- corruption and transparency norms through processes of 
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socialisation. He concludes that a more long- term perspective is needed 
when assessing the success of anti- corruption efforts. In the next chapter, 
Roberto Belloni examines the dual role that civil society has played, in 
some cases leading the fight against corruption by publicly exposing 
corrupt activities, but in other instances being co- opted by dominant 
patron–client networks. In the final chapter of the book, Alexandra Gillies 
and Page Dykstra scrutinise the reasoning and logic that underpin two 
important transparency initiatives in the management of natural resources: 
the EITI and PWYP. Their analysis suggests that the success of these pro-
grammes can ultimately be attributed to committed leadership, a support-
ive governance environment and optimal timing in implementation.
 Both peacebuilding actors and analysts continue to wrestle with the 
problem of corruption and how it impacts efforts to end violence and build 
or rebuild a reasonable and stable political order in war- torn countries. As 
the contributions to this volume show, it is too simplistic to frame this 
debate in terms of tensions between clear categories, such as corruption 
versus development, or anti- corruption versus stability (see also Jarstad and 
Sisk 2008). In this book, we have included a wide range of opinions on the 
character of corruption, on its consequences for peacebuilding and on the 
best ways to address these problems. While not all contributors to this 
volume necessarily share the assessments in this introductory chapter, they 
concur that the reality of both corruption and peacebuilding is too complex 
to be captured in simple, catch- all concepts, and that this relationship is too 
varied to be addressed with universalist policy prescriptions.
Notes
 1 We would like to thank Emily Paddon, Michael Urban, Elly Harrowell and the 
participants of the first Oxford Conference on Governance and Transparency 
for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this chapter.
 2 See Transparency International website. Online, available at: www.transpar-
ency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq, accessed 18 January 2011.
 3 Arguably an official acting against the public interest because she was threat-
ened with violence is not corrupt, however, the person threatening her would 
be considered corrupt, and so would the transaction itself.
 4 See for example Delesgues and Torabi (2010: 30) for perceptions of corrup-
tion in rule of law institutions in Afghanistan.
 5 For critical views on the costs of power sharing, see Tull and Mehler 2005; and 
Mehler 2009.
 6 Examples include the 2002 Global and All- Inclusive Agreement in the Congo, 
and the trust fund set up to buy the RENAMO rebels’ assent to the peace agree-
ment in Mozambique.
 7 American official familiar with Liberia’s peace negotiations. Personal interview, 
May 2007, Monrovia.
 8 See UNdata website. Online, available at: http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.
aspx?crName=Liberia.
 9 On the complex moral issues and political issues raised by the delivery of 
humanitarian aid, see Keen 1994; and Anderson 1999.
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10 ODE Talks Podcast: Interview with Professor Paul Collier, 24 November 2010, 
AusAID, Office for Development Effectiveness. Transcript online, available at: 
www.ode.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pdf/transcript- colliernov2010.doc 
accessed 8 February 2011.
11 For example, in the 2009 Afghanistan election, voting cards were being sold for 
US$10 each (about £6) by Kabul traders. In the north of the country, one tribal 
leader claimed that ‘he had been offered thousands of dollars by campaign 
teams in exchange for delivering large blocks of votes’ (see Pannell 2009).
12 One important exception has been the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
which explicitly challenged this practice. See Millennium Challenge Corpora-
tion website, online, available at: www.mcc.gov/.
13 This was reflected in the cautious response from other African leaders to the 
GEMAP in Liberia, seeing it as ‘a threatening precedent for eroding African 
Sovereignty’ (McGovern 2008: 341).
14 Personal interviews with representatives from major donor countries, Prishtina, 
July 2010.
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